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NOTES
JUDICIAL REVIEW AS MIDCAL ACTIVE SUPERVISION:
IMMUNIZING PRIVATE PARTIES FROM
ANTITRUST LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
The Parker v. Brown' state action doctrine2 may immunize3 a private
party4 from liability under federal antitrust laws.5 Private conduct is im-
mune, however, only when it satisfies the two-pronged test developed in
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.6 The
challenged conduct must be pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirm-
atively expressed" state policy, and it must be " 'actively supervised' by
1. 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (immunizing actions of a raisin cartel from liability under the
Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986))).
2. The Parker state action doctrine provides that the Sherman Act was not intended
to restrain state action or official action directed by a state. See 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner,
Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application $ 212a, at 68
(1978); infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
For the first fifty-three years after the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, litigants
and courts virtually ignored the potential conflict between the antitrust laws and the
anticompetitive actions of state actors. See Wiley, A Capture Theory ofAntitrust Federal-
i rm, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 714 (1986). In 1943, the Court created the state action immu-
nity doctrine in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). However, it was not until
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), that the Parker doctrine became
controversial. Most of its substantive development has taken place in cases decided after
1975. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
3. The state action doctrine is not a true "exemption" or "immunity" from the fed-
eral antitrust laws; rather, it identifies conduct not subject to those laws. The terms ex-
emption and immunity are used for the sake of convenience. See Fuchs v. Rural Elec.
Convenience Coop., 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) f 68,247, at 59,537 n.1 (7th Cir. 1988); see
also infra note 19.
4. The scope of this Note is limited to the Parker doctrine's application to private
parties. While Parker v. Brown only immunized the actions of the state itself, the Court
subsequently recognized that state action immunity could also apply in a suit against a
private party. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48, 56-57 (1985).
Parker v. Brown was "premised on the assumption that Congress, in enacting the Sher-
man Act, did not intend to compromise the States' ability to regulate their domestic
commerce." Id. at 56. Regulating commerce in today's complex economy necessitates
some delegation of state authority to private actors. If Parker immunity were limited to
the actions of public officials, this assumed congressional purpose would be frustrated, for
a state would be unable to use delegation to implement needed regulatory programs. See
id. at 56.
For a discussion of the private/non-private bifurcation in the Parker doctrine case law,
see infra note 40.
5. Courts have generally assumed that the Parker doctrine applies to other federal
antitrust laws in addition to the Sherman Act. See Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited: The
State Action Doctrine after Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 898 n.4
(1977).
6. 445 U.S. 97 (1980); see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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the State itself."' 7 State agency review of private anticompetitive conduct
typically satisfies the second-"active supervision"-prong of the Midcal
test.8 This Note examines an issue specifically left open by the Supreme
Court:9 whether judicial review by state courts should likewise satisfy the
active supervision requirement.
Part I of this Note examines Parker v. Brown's foundations"0 and dis-
cusses the conflicting policy views concerning what the Parker doctrine
should be used to accomplish." Part II describes how recent applica-
tions of the Midcal test indicate a return to the deferential view of Parker
immunity, 2 and analyzes the constitutional and economic effects of a
rigorous application of the Midcal requirements.I3
Part III of this Note examines whether judicial review, as opposed to
agency review, satisfies the requirements of active state supervision. 4
This Note argues that state court supervision of state policy may be as
"active" as is necessary for state action immunity, 5 and concludes that
the better approach would allow judicial review as active supervision to
7. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980) (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978)).
8. See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48, 62 (1985). Review by a state supreme court acting in a legislative capacity, and
review by the executive branch, should also satisfy the Midcal active supervision require-
ment. See Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential
Economic Federalism, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 227, 240 (1987); Lopatka, The State of "State
Action Antitrust Immunity: A Progress Report, 46 La. L. Rev. 941, 1038 (1986).
9. See Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1664-65 (1988). Only a few months later
the 1 1th Circuit concluded that judicial review may constitute active state supervision for
purposes of state action immunity. See Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 851 F.2d
1273, 1282 (11th Cir.), vacated, 861 F.2d 1233 (1988) (en banc).
10. The language in Parker v. Brown accepts federalism as the basis of the state action
immunity:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which,
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify
a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress.
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint
that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state.
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943); see infra note 21.
11. The critical analyses of the Parker doctrine can roughly be grouped into two
views-the revisionist and the deferential-depending on each author's view of what the
federal antitrust laws should be used to accomplish. See infra notes 30-42 and accompa-
nying text.
12. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 48-75 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 76-100 and accompanying text. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical
Center, 851 F.2d 1273 (11th Cir.), vacated, 861 F.2d 1233 (1988) (en banc), concluded
that there is no principled basis for distinguishing judicial review from agency review.
See id. at 1282.
15. See infra notes 101-115 and accompanying text.
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immunize private parties from antitrust liability. 16
I. THE PARKER STATE ACTION IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
A. Foundations
The Parker doctrine was conceived to protect state action from federal
antitrust liability.1 7 The Court in Parker v. Brown found that the Sher-
man Act was intended to suppress the "business combinations" of pri-
vate individuals, and not "to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature."'"
There are, however, two opposing views on why the Parker immu-
nity19 doctrine was originally conceived.20 One view is that Parker v.
16. Although this Note focuses, at times, on the peer review context developed in two
recent cases, Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 851 F.2d 1273 (11th Cir.), vacated,
861 F.2d 1233 (1988) (en banc), and Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986),
reversed, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988), its scope is not intended to be thereby limited. Judicial
review could satisfy Midcal active supervision with respect to all private party delegates
of state power.
17. See P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 212a, at 68.
18. Id. (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943)).
19. Inconsistent use of the terms "immunity," "exemption" and "preemption" results
in a certain degree of confusion in the Parker doctrine case law and literature. See Han-
dler, Antitrust-1978, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1363, 1378-83 (1978).
"Immunity" is perhaps the best word to express the concept behind the Parker doc-
trine. Immunity is an internal concept; it concerns only one law. An action is immune
from liability under a federal law when the law, as drafted, was not meant to apply. The
state action doctrine is best labelled an immunity because Congress did not intend that
the Sherman Act apply to state action.
In contrast, an "exemption" from a federal law occurs when a second federal law
removes a specific act from possible liability under the first. See Smith, Antitrust Immu-
nity for State Action: A FunctionalApproach, 31 Baylor L. Rev. 263, 285 (1979) (exemp-
tion is a concept that purports to resolve an apparent conflict between two or more
enactments of a single sovereign). Congress in fact created a true exemption from anti-
trust liability for certain peer review activities. See Health Care Quality Improvement
Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (Supp. IV 1986). The Act expressly provides that
it does not change other immunities under the law, including state action "immunity."
See id.; see also Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1665 n.8 (1988).
"Preemption" deals with the interplay between the enactments of two different sover-
eigns. See id. (quoting Handler, supra, at 1379). There can be no state action "immu-
nity" unless the state statute authorizing the state conduct is not in conflict with a
preemptive federal law in the first place. A court considering whether a defendant's con-
duct is immune under Parker must first ask whether or assume that the state statute is
valid under the supremacy clause. See P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An
Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Application 209.2, at 92 (Supp. 1988). A
state statute is preempted, for example, when it mandates a per se violation of the Sher-
man Act. When a state statute merely authorizes conduct which would be analyzed
under the rule of reason, it is not preempted. Nevertheless, conduct pursuant to such a
statute may be an antitrust violation if it does not satisfy the Midcal requirements. See id.
209.1, at 84-85.
Courts applying the Parker doctrine to the actions of private parties usually do not
speak in preemption terms, having taken the validity of the governing statute for granted.
In contrast, courts talk in more explicit preemption terms when the statute itself is chal-
lenged. See id. 209.2, at 94 (citing Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986) and
Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982)).
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Brown was fundamentally motivated by a concern for federalism2 a
notion of deference to state sovereigns in the absence of clear congres-
sional intent to the contrary.22 The other view is that Parker v. Brown is
20. For purposes of this Note, the critical analyses of the Parker doctrine's founda-
tions are grouped into two views. Support for this distinction on the basis of the Parker
doctrine's foundations is abundant. See Wiley, The Berkeley Rent Control Case: Treating
Victims as Villains, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 157, 166-68 (1986) (controversy surrounding state
action immunity is the result of its uncertain foundation within the competing interests of
federalism); see also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 605 (1976) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (unclear whether Congress intended the reach of the Sherman Act to
expand along with that of the commerce power); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2,
212a, at 67-69 (Parker was decided on the basis of federalism as well as Sherman Act
language and legislative history); L. A. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 734
(1977) (Parker was decided in a particular legislative context); Posner, The Proper Rela-
tionship Between State Regulation and the FederalAntitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 693
(1974) (Parker stated that the Sherman Act may be supplanted by states in implementing
governmental policies); Smith, supra note 19, at 289 (Parker is rooted in a particular
legislative context and does not generally exempt state sanctioned activities).
Critics suggest that it is the extreme generality of the Sherman Act that invites judicial
analyses producing so much uncertainty in antitrust decisionmaking. See Kissam, Anti-
trust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 595,
685 (1982).
The half-century gap between the enactment of the Sherman Act and the development
of the Parker immunity doctrine accentuates the uncertainty. The 1890 Congress that
enacted the Sherman Act held a narrow view of the commerce clause. It assumed that
states could enact laws affecting actions wholly within the borders of a single state with-
out federal intervention. Since the Sherman Act's applicability has grown with the com-
merce power, the problem in today's application of the Parker doctrine postdates the
statute. See Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. Law & Econ.
23, 40-41 (1983). That is to say, the unequivocal words of Parker v. Brown, by force of
changing economic policy, appear to have lost some of their clarity. See id.
21. Federalism denotes a concept of the proper relationships between the states and
the federal government. See G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 70 (11th ed. 1985) (federal-
ism is the division of powers achieved by specifying, in the Constitution, those powers
Congress might exercise, and by emphasizing that undelegated powers are reserved to the
states).
Although the Parker doctrine is clearly based on federalism, it is the degree to which
one would intervene on state regulations-in other words, the degree to which one con-
siders federalism a non-interventionist doctrine-that determines how broadly one draws
Parker immunity from federal antitrust laws. See, e.g., Wiley, supra note 20, at 167 (to
the threat of special interest groups controlling state law, the non-interventionist school
of antitrust federalism must say, "I see it, but the difficulty of the problem and the need to
defer to state and local decisionmaking puts it out of bounds for antitrust.")
The Parker doctrine is the product of the struggle inherent in our two-tier governmen-
tal system. Federal antitrust policy seeks freely competitive markets; states have an inter-
est in controlling local activities. Parker is a public policy attempt to balance the
competing ideals and interests. See Casenote, Patrick v. Burget: State Action or Private
Collusion?, 23 Willamette L. Rev. 937, 939-40 (1987).
22. See Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1662 (1988) ("Relying on principles of
federalism and state sovereignty, [the Parker] Court refused to find in the Sherman Act
'an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents.' ") (quot-
ing Parker, 317 U.S. at 351).
Under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, state/federal conflicts are resolved in
favor of federal law. "Although a uniform resolution of the conflict in favor of antitrust
is . .. unthinkable-and surely was not part of the structure forged by Congress in
1890-it is difficult to find in the statutes any form of 'inverse supremacy' principle under
[Vol. 57
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a decision rooted in a particular legislative context-interpreting an an-
ticompetitive state law that was consistent with a similar federal pol-
iey23-rather than a sweeping deference to state economic regulation.24
The majority of state action immunity cases have been decided since
1975.25 These decisions can be mapped on a spectrum between the two
views, depending on the degree to which a particular court was willing to
accept the non-interventionist language in Parker v. Brown.26 One reason
for this spate of recent state action immunity decisions is Parker's uncer-
tain foundation. 27 This uncertainty has stimulated a deluge of critical
analyses,28 using the Parker doctrine as a platform to express views on
which state and local rules always prevail." Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 25; see also
Kissam, supra note 20, at 621 n. 118 (constitutional values should be employed to resolve
open questions of statutory interpretation). The troubling constitutional question that
lies at the heart of the Parker doctrine is the proper accommodation between federalism
and the supremacy clause. Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 47.
23. Parker rebutted a challenge to a California statute that authorized the establish-
ment of agricultural marketing programs restricting competition among growers and
maintaining prices. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 344 (1943). Some legal scholars
believe that the Court was influenced by the fact that the state statute was consistent with
a federal statute that also authorized marketing restrictions on agricultural products. See
L.A. Sullivan, supra note 20, at 734. But see I P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, %
212a, at 68 (although the California law's consistency with federal policy could in itself
create an implied exemption to the antitrust laws, the Parker Court did not rely on that
fact).
24. See L.A. Sullivan, supra note 20, at 734 (state action exemption is not an impera-
tive, nor a rule to be mechanically applied, but an invitation to judge the proper relation-
ship of state policy to antitrust laws); see also Smith, supra note 19, at 289 (the functional
approach to the doctrine of antitrust immunity is a reflection of the judicial creation of
state action immunity as an accommodation of potentially competing sovereigns).
25. Since 1975, the Supreme Court has decided twelve cases concerning state action
immunity. Six of those cases found immunity: Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260
(1986); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48
(1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466
U.S. 558 (1984); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Six have declared state action immunity inapplicable: Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct.
1658 (1988); Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); City of La-
fayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
26. 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943); see supra note 10.
Parker was possibly based on statements in the legislative history of the Sherman Act
that affirmatively express a desire not to invade the legislative territory of the states. See,
e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 632 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Garland,
supra note 25, at 511 n.154 (1987) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1707); Lopatka, supra note 8, at
952 n.48.
However, the law interpreting the Sherman Act is basically judge-made. See, e.g., Eas-
terbrook, supra note 20, at 25; Smith, supra note 19, at 264.
27. See supra note 20.
28. See, e.g., Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action"After Lafayette, 95 Harv.
L. Rev. 435 (1981); Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. Law &
Econ. 23 (1983); Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Polit-
ical Process, 96 Yale L.J. 486 (1987); Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1363
1988]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
what federal antitrust laws should accomplish.29
B. Policy Views
The policy views on using Parker immunity in antitrust regulation can
be divided into two camps, here labelled the "revisionist" and the "defer-
ential."3 The revisionist view suggests a narrowing or reformulation of
the state action immunity doctrine, to realign it with the corresponding
economic interpretation suggested for antitrust laws in general.3 The
(1978); Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Eco-
nomic Federalism, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 227 (1987); Kissam, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges:
Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 595 (1982); Lopatka, The State of
"State Action"Antitrust Immunity A Progress Report, 46 La. L. Rev. 941 (1986); Page,
Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic The-
ory of Legislation, 1987 Duke L.J. 618 (1987); Posner, The Proper Relationship Between
State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 693 (1974); Sachs,
Antitrust, the States and the Professions, 52 Antitrust L.J. 189 (1983); Smith, Antitrust
Immunity for State Action: A Functional Approach, 31 Baylor L. Rev. 263 (1979);
Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75
Colum. L. Rev. 328 (1975); Wiley, A Capture Theory ofAntitrust Federalism, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 713 (1986); Wiley, The Berkeley Rent Control Case: Treating Victims as Villains,
1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 157 (1986).
29. There is an inherent conflict between the mandate of the Sherman Act-free mar-
ket competition-and the states' choice to regulate in the first place. See Casenote, supra
note 21, at 939-40.
As Professor Jorde explains, state economic regulation usually supplants competition
and free markets. States commonly regulate utilities, license professions, zone property,
limit public transportation permits, or place other price or entry controls upon selected
businesses. Allocative inefficiencies may result from these regulations, but these costs are
offset by several perceived benefits of deferential federalism: citizen participation in local
government, efficiency in government, creative experimentation by the states, and diffu-
sion of power. Jorde, supra note 8, at 231-34.
30. For purposes of this discussion, the critical analyses have been grouped according
to the policy each critic believes should govern the application of the Parker doctrine.
These views do not necessarily correspond to the two views in the preceding section con-
cerning the foundations of the doctrine. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
The "deferential" view holds that the federal judiciary should not interfere with a
state's political decision, however misguided, to substitute regulation for the operation of
the market. Garland, supra note 25, at 487-88; see also Page, supra note 28, at 621 (the
Court has long recognized that due regard for state sovereignty requires that congres-
sional intent to preempt be particularly explicit in areas traditionally regulated by the
states). As Professor Areeda explains, erroneous application of state policy does not ne-
gate the underlying state authorization. Wise and efficient federalism argues against re-
view by antitrust courts of ordinary state agency errors. Areeda, supra note 28, at 450,
453.
The "revisionist" view holds that state restraints, even if adequately supervised, should
be subject to some level of federal review through the antitrust laws. See I P. Areeda &
D. Turner, supra note 2, 215c, at 97-98; Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 23 n.1, 27;
Posner, supra note 20, at 695-96; Wiley, supra note 20, at 714 & n.74; see also Kissam,
supra note 20, at 684 n.443 (citing the apparent ascendancy of the economic efficiency
view in actual court decisions).
31. The revisionist view, as a product of Chicago School antitrust economics, is criti-
cized for underenforcing the existing antitrust laws. See Sachs, Antitrust, the States and
the Professions, 52 Antitrust L.J. 189, 202 (1983) (evident in the 1980s Department of
[Vol. 57
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revisionists' goal of allocative efficiency32 is essentially 'antithetical to lan-
guage in Parker concerning deference 3 to anticompetitive state regula-
tion. 4 The logical extension of the revisionist view is that state
restraints-even those clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed, and
actively supervised-should be subjected to some level of substantive
review.3 5
Justice policy to retreat from antitrust enforcement in certain areas which have tradition-
ally been the subject of vigorous enforcement).
In the context of Parker state action immunity, however, the revisionist approach
would seek to impose liability where the deferential view would find immunity. See Jorde
supra note 8, at 235, 238-40.
32. Although numerous theories have been proposed under the economic efficiency
banner, this Note groups them under the "revisionist" heading. These theories have in
common the notion that allocative efficiency is the primary goal of federal antitrust laws.
See Wiley, supra note 20, at 172 (that which increases efficiency should not be a violation,
but that which decreases it should be struck down regardless of any so-called "immu-
nity").
Allocative efficiency is the primary goal of the price theory model of perfect competi-
tion. See, e.g., P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, Cases 107, at 5, 1 116, at
18-20 (3d ed. 1981); see also Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L.
Rev. 213, 226 (1985). Perfect competition is theoretically achieved when marginal cost
equals marginal revenue and no competitor has the market power to raise prices. See P.
Areeda, supra, at 11 107, 116. The term "allocative efficiency" describes the form an
ideal distribution of resources would take in a market tending toward perfect competi-
tion. See id.
33. See supra note 10.
34. "Capture theory" is one example of a revisionist theory. Though not the extreme
model, it is in effect a form of substantive review. Essentially, it operates on the assump-
tion that producers have gained control of, or "captured" the political bodies regulating
them. This suspicion "has inclined people to view regulation as the product and protec-
tor of producer interests." Wiley, supra note 2, at 714; see Easterbrook, supra note 20, at
23. Fundamentally, however, capture theory preempts certain state economic choices no
matter how explicitly they are chosen through legislation or otherwise. See Garland,
supra note 25, at 509; Page, supra note 28, at 622-25; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 32,
at 249-55 (drawing a distinction between special interest and efficient legislation is mani-
festly inconsistent with the general Chicago School theory that when a market speaks-
even a political market-the presumption is very strong that it should be listened to).
35. The extreme view is that state-imposed restraints, even if adequately supervised,
should be subject to a traditional rule of reason analysis, and would be sustained only if
their potential benefits outweighed their harms. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579, 610-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2,
215c, at 97-98 (1978).
Critics point out that allowing the federal antitrust court to determine which state-
imposed restraints are justified and which are not ultimately enables that court to over-
ride the legislative judgments of the states-precisely what the Parker decision was in-
tended to prevent. Moreover, such an approach lacks judicially manageable standards.
See id.
Recently, the states themselves have shown a tendency to enforce federal and state
antitrust laws more strictly. See P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 19, 1 208, at 79.
This is perhaps the most effective way of relieving the potential tensions between the
states' right to regulate and enforcement of federal antitrust policy. See Sachs, supra note
31, at 192-93 (states are in a better position than the federal government to require com-
pliance with antitrust laws). Stricter state enforcement of antitrust laws circumvents the
federalism tensions inherent in the Parker doctrine. See id. The tension between compe-
tition and regulation that is closest to the heart of antitrust is thereby more clearly
exposed.
1988]
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The revisionist view appeared to be gaining ground during the late
1970s, when Parker immunity was narrowly construed.36 Municipalities
were subject to treble damages for conduct pursuant to local ordinances
unless the state itself expressed a parallel policy authorizing such munici-
pal regulation.3 7 It appeared as though the state had to "compel" an-
ticompetitive conduct before such action would be considered immune.38
Recently, however, the cases have returned to a more deferential ap-
proach,3 9 at least in situations where the anticompetitive actor is clearly
not a private party.4° This deferential approach follows a trend evident
36. See, eg., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975); see also Wiley, supra note 2, at 714; Kissam, supra note 20, at 684 n.443.
37. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
Before the law was clarified in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985),
both prongs of the Midcal test were applied to municipalities. See id. at 46. In other
words, in order for a municipality to take advantage of Parker immunity, it had to prove
that its local regulations were authorized and supervised by the state itself.
38. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court seemed to say
that it was not enough that the bar association's activities complemented the objectives of
the professional ethics codes, but that any such "anticompetitive activities must be com-
pelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign." Id. at 791 (emphasis added).
39. To find immunity for the anticompetitive actions of a municipality today, a court
merely examines whether the actions were taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state
policy to displace competition. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39-
40 (1985). The Court does not require active state supervision. See id.
Compulsion is no longer required under the first Midcal prong. See Southern Motor
Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 60 (1985); Hallie, 471 U.S.
at 46-47; P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 19, T 212.5, at 145-50; see also Jorde,
supra note 8, at 242-43 (by rejecting the compulsion requirement, the Court relaxed the
clear articulation requirement).
40. State action immunity has recently expanded for non-private parties. See, e.g.,
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45-46 (1985) (active supervision ele-
ment not required for municipalities, and probably not for other non-private actors); P.
Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 19, 212.7, at 156 (dispensing with the active
supervision element for municipalities implies, a fortiori, the same for departments and
agencies of the state itself).
However, where state or municipal regulation by a private party is involved, active
state supervision must be shown, even where a clearly articulated state policy exists. See
Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 601 F. Supp. 892, 901-03 (D. Md.
1985); P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 19, 212.7, at 155-61. State action im-
munity thus appears to have narrowed for private parties. See Patrick v. Burget, 108 S.
Ct. 1658, 1663 (1988) (decisions over the last decade have effectively narrowed the state
action immunity of private parties); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v.
United States, 471 U.S. 48, 73-74 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the Midcal require-
ments limited the scope of state action immunity for private parties); Areeda, supra note
28, at 438. But see generally Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349 (1982) (using public/private example to illustrate the
decline of such legal distinctions).
With respect to the private/non-private bifurcation, the policy of the Court, requiring a
stricter standard for private parties, coincides with its policy under the other antitrust
immunity doctrine-Noerr-Pennington.
Noerr-Pennington immunity protects the efforts of private parties who petition a gov-
ernmental body from the anticompetitive consequences resulting from enactment of the
sought after legislation. The doctrine holds that federal courts will not (except in cases of
"sham") use a defendant's initiation of governmental processes-lobbying, petitioning
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in critical analyses41 that propose a return to non-interventionist federal-
ism. The deferential view urges judicial restraint, absent more explicit
congressional intent, in applying federal antitrust laws to those areas tra-
ditionally regulated by the states.42
II. THE MIDCAL TEST FOR STATE ACTION IMMUNITY
A. The Midcal Test Exemplifies the Deferential View
Recent applications of the Midcal test43 exemplify the return to a more
deferential approach in using the Parker immunity doctrine. The first
Midcal requirement, that state legislation be clearly articulated and af-
agencies, filing lawsuits, or the like-to expose that defendant to Sherman Act remedies
that would unacceptably chill such political advocacy. See United Mine Workers v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
This policy of applying a stricter standard for private parties is particularly evident in
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1931 (1988). There the
Supreme Court divided over Noerr-Pennington application. The majority found that the
"context and nature" of the activity-in this case the standard-setting process of a private
association-determine the scope of Noerr-Pennington immunity. See id. at 1939.
The particular association in Allied Tube set standards for fire-proof building materials.
These standards were summarily adopted by a majority of state legislatures. Private par-
ties in this case succeeded in "packing" the association's vote and thereby denying ap-
proval for a competitor's new product. See id. at 1935.
Although several justices strongly argued that this action-petitioning of a quasi-legis-
lative governmental body-fit squarely within the Noerr-Pennington definition of immu-
nity, see id. at 1943 (White, J., dissenting), the majority did not agree. Concerned about
the blatant and effective maneuverings of private parties to encourage anticompetitive
regulations, no immunity was found. Cf. id. at 1942 (no Noerr immunity where an eco-
nomically interested private party exercises decision-making authority).
The relevance of this case to Parker immunity is the Court's parallel wariness in grant-
ing antitrust immunity to the actions of private parties under either immunity doctrine.
Indeed, the language of the Court in Allied Tube is remarkably similar to the language
used in Parker immunity cases; the majority actually cites to Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975),
two important state action immunity cases.
41. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 28, at 454-55; Garland, supra note 25, at 487-88;
Page, supra note 28, at 622-23.
42. See Page, supra note 28, at 621 (the Court has long recognized that proper judi-
cial restraint requires congressional preemptive intent to be particularly explicit in areas
traditionally regulated by the states).
43. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48
(1985) (Midcal test used to immunize the actions of private parties-common carrier rate
agencies); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985) (Midcal test used to
immunize a municipality); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568-69, 579-80 (1984) (when
sovereign acts neither Midcal prong is necessary).
The two-prong test, established in Midcal as the sine qua non of state action immunity
for private parties, actually can be traced back to earlier cases. In finding state action
immunity for a state bar association, the Supreme Court deemed it "significant that the
state policy is so clearly and affirmatively expressed and that the State's supervision is so
active." Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977). Indeed, even the case that created
the state action immunity doctrine distinguishes mere "authorization" of anticompetitive
activity from situations where the state "adopts" and "enforces" a system of regulation.
See, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
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firmatively expressed as state policy, is the more important one.' To
satisfy it, a state must be explicit about which activities are included in its
plan of regulation.45
The second requirement, that anticompetitive conduct pursuant to
state regulation be actively supervised by the state itself, merely cor-
roborates the first. Demonstrating active supervision46 ensures that the
state is committed to a particular regulation. As the Court noted in
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, the active supervision requirement
serves "essentially an evidentiary function:.., one way of ensuring that
the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to state pol-
icy."' 47 In sum, to satisfy the Midcal requirements, a state must show
that it intends to displace competition in the marketplace; the supervision
prong is required simply to provide evidence of such state intent.
B. The Procedural Nature of the Midcal Test
The Midcal test is a device used to distinguish anticompetitive actions
in which the state is to some degree involved from the purely private
actions of non-governmental actors.48 When the Midcal test is correctly
applied, the court looks to whether the state intends to displace competi-
tion and whether it actively supervises private anticompetitive conduct
committed pursuant to state policy, rather than how well it has chosen to
do so. This is a "procedural"4 9 application of the test; it distinguishes
between situations where a state intends to displace free market competi-
tion and situations where regulation is merely a "gauzy cloak of state
44. See Lopatka, supra note 8, at 1038-39 (supervision should not be required at all
for immunity, but should merely serve as evidence of state intent).
45. This requirement "reinforces representative political processes by ensuring that
the decision to displace antitrust [enforcement] is made only after competing interest
groups have survived the traditional Madisonian gauntlet of legislative procedures."
Page, supra note 28, at 619; see 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 214a, at 83; P.
Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 19, 212.3, at 123-43.
46. The active supervision requirement stems from the recognition that "[w]here a
private party is engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is
acting to further his own interests, rather than the governmental interests of the States."
Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1663 (1988) (quoting Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985)). This requirement "mandates that the State exercise ulti-
mate control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct." See Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at
1663; see also 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1987) (finding a state's
liquor pricing system not actively supervised by the state); I P. Areeda & D. Turner,
supra note 2, 213b, at 74-75 (final control must be in the hands of independent state
officials).
47. 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985) (emphasis added); see Fuchs v. Rural Elec. Convenience
Coop., 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,247, at 59,541 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Halie).
48. See sources cited infra notes 50-51.
49. See Jorde, supra note 8, at 236 ("two-pronged test is process-oriented because it
focuses on the mechanics that produce an anticompetitive regulation, rather than on the
desirability of the regulation").
In contrast, a "substantive" application of the Midcal test examines the value of state
regulation to determine whether it merits state action immunity. See supra notes 34-35
and accompanying text.
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involvement""0 cast over what is essentially private anticompetitive
conduct.-"
Although the Midcal test, on its face, provides a simple and straight-
forward test for state action immunity,5" it has resulted in judicial activ-
ism.5 3 When courts construe the Midcal test too strictly-to require a
high standard for either Midcal requirement-the procedural nature of
the test tends to be subsumed in a substantive review of the underlying
state regulation.54 While a court must somehow distinguish action of the
state from purely private activity cloaked in official state action garb,
rigorous application of the Midcal test invites the court to intrude into
state legislative processes. 5
A procedural application of the Midcal requirements avoids the dan-
gers inherent in substantive review. 6 In addition, a finer balance is
50. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46-47 (1985) (quoting Califor-
nia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980)).
51. See P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 19, 212.1, at 110-15.
52. See Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction
and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U.L. Rev.
1099, 1115-21 (1981); Page, supra note 28, at 642-44.
53. See Kissam, supra note 20, at 620-23 (Midcal test seems to invite judicial activism
in federal antitrust laws); see, e.g., Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
54. As Professor Jorde explains:
[T]he Court's willingness to apply the rigorous requirements of the process test
to invalidate state attempts to delegate economic decisionmaking... marked a
clear retreat from the principles of economic federalism underpinning Parker.
Although not as openly defiant as the substantive review called for by Cantor,
the rigorous process test invited courts to intrude into state legislative processes
to determine whether the words of a statute or its legislative history could jus-
tify a state action exemption.
Jorde, supra note 8, at 237 (referring to Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579 (1976)).
55. See id.
56. The danger avoided by using a procedural test as opposed to a substantive test is
the unwarranted willingness of courts to subject state regulatory policies to supervening
federal antitrust policy. See Wiley, supra note 2, at 714.
One interesting theory, concerned with a substantive application of the state action
doctrine, opines that "Parker was decided largely on the ground that the Court was un-
willing to reenter the political mire of the Lochner [v. New York] era under the guise of
Sherman Act preemption analysis." Page, supra note 30, at 624; See Verkuil, supra note
28, at 329; see also Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Com-
parative Institutional Alternative, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1350, 1383-90 (1981).
In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court struck down, as a violation of
substantive due process, a New York law limiting the hours of bakers. See id. at 64-65.
In the early 1900s, federal courts used the Lochner concept of substantive due process to
invalidate federal and state progressive legislation aimed at regulating economic behavior
in the marketplace.
The Court's repudiation of the Lochner penchant came at much the same time that
Parker announced the state action immunity doctrine. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934) (sustaining a New York regulatory scheme for fixing milk prices).
Under Professor Verkuil's theory, "[a]lthough presumably disdainful of substantive
economic due process, the federal courts have seized upon another approach to oversee
state economic regulation, [namely the] application of the antitrust laws to the offensive
conduct." Verkuil, supra note 28, at 329. Although this appears to be a welcome correc-
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achieved between antitrust laws and federalism: a procedural application
of the Midcal test permits the states to play an active role in regulating
the economy and reduces federal court intervention into state regulatory
regimes.57
C. Efficiency Considerations in Applying Midcal
A strict application of the Midcal active supervision prong may result
in legitimate state regulation being invalidated on a pretext of inadequate
supervision." In addition, a strict active supervision requirement forces
the states to adopt the form of regulation least favorable to allocative
efficiency. 9 Even when a strict supervision requirement is imposed only
on delegation of state authority to private parties, it requires costly super-
vision and limits the methods a state may employ to implement a pro-
gram of regulation. 0 A recent Parker immunity case,61 for example,
appears to require an entire administrative agency infrastructure in order
to supervise the state-mandated peer review decisions of local hospitals.62
Such heavily supervised regulation of state delegated powers may lead to
higher costs for consumers and regulated firms.63
Both the revisionist and the deferential theorists would likely agree in
condemning the result of a strict application of the Midcal test.' The
deferential view would oppose a strict construction of the Midcal require-
tive measure to runaway state regulations, it compromises the policies of federalism and
judicial self-restraint. See id.
The theory that Parker followed the Court's concern in Nebbia (and its progeny up-
holding state and federal regulation) is arguably incorrect, because it concludes that the
guiding tenet of the Nebbia/Parker Court's reconstruction was the notion that the states
should be free to make their own economic decisions. See id. at 329 & nn.7-9. The intent
behind the repudiation of Lochner was to allow federal laws to regulate the economic
marketplace. However, a necessary corollary was to allow state regulation to exist. See,
e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage
law for women); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (refusing to invalidate, on substan-
tive economic due process grounds, a state scheme to fix milk prices).
The analogy of substantive economic due process to antitrust review serves as an apt
warning against substantive formulations of Parker state action immunity. See Verkuil,
supra note 28, at 334-35. See generally Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substan-
tive Due Process, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 379, 439-41 (1988).
57. See Jorde, supra note 8, at 247.
58. See id. at 248-49.
59. See Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 29 (any limits imposed by the Court on the
methods of state regulation are unlikely to be beneficial); Garland, supra note 25, at 499.
Furthermore, inefficient regulation decreases competition among the states to attract
economic activity. See Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 33-35 (competition is greatest if
states may adopt any regulations they choose at any level of government they choose).
60. See Jorde, supra note 8, at 248-49.
61. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
62. It is questionable whether such a scenario would even be possible, in light of the
sheer number of decisions made by peer review commissions each year. See infra notes
93, 95.
63. See Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 32-33.
64. It is unusual that the revisionist view would parallel the deferential view in con-
demning the same result. See supra note 31.
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ments because this would compromise the procedural nature of the
test.6 5 The revisionist view would tend to accept a more lenient Midcal
test over the alternative of the costly and inefficient requirement of heav-
ily supervised state regulation.66 One revisionist argument, for example,
is that the best form of regulation of a natural monopoly may be competi-
tion for the right to be the monopolist.67 Similarly, an outright immunity
from antitrust laws may be much better for consumers than a require-
ment of heavily-supervised regulation.68
The Supreme Court considered efficiencies in applying the Midcal test
in Southern Motor Carriers.69 The Court noted the importance of the
"range of regulatory alternatives available to the State"7 0 and the "man-
ner in which the States ... have intended their permissive policies to
work,"'" implying that efficiency in state regulations is a federal concern.
Southern Motor Carriers considered legislation in three states that ex-
pressly permitted motor carriers to submit collective rate proposals to
public service commissions, which had the authority to accept, reject or
modify any such recommendation. Citing their efficiency, the Court de-
clared the collective ratemakers immune from antitrust liability.72 The
Court noted that "[c]onstruing the Sherman Act to prohibit collective
rate proposals eliminates the free choice necessary to ensure that [the
policies of efficiency and competition] function in the manner intended
by the States."73
Although Southern Motor Carriers was concerned with the first Midcal
prong and whether state "compulsion"'74 of private anticompetitive con-
duct was required for state action immunity, the efficiency considerations
apply equally to the second Midcal prong. A strict active supervision
requirement limits the states' ability to choose the most economically effi-
cient regulation.75 Thus, analysis of the purpose and function of the
Midcal test exposes the potential problems inherent in a non-procedural
application of the test. Strict interpretation of the active supervision
prong, in particular, facilitates unwarranted substantive review of state
regulation and may result in allocative inefficiency.
65. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
66. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 32 (heavy supervision would lead to higher
costs for consumers and firms); Wiley, supra note 2, at 733-39 (strict Midcal requirements
generate inherently ineffective and costly regulation).
67. See Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 32-33.
68. See id. at 32.
69. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 59-
60 (1985).
70. Id. at 61.
71. Id. at 59.
72. See id. at 59-60, 63.
73. Id. at 59-60.
74. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
75. See Jorde, supra note 8, at 236-40.
1988]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
III. THE ACTIVE SUPERVISION REQUIREMENT
A. Agency Review Satisfies the Active Supervision Requirement
A state typically satisfies the Midcal active supervision prong by giving
an administrative agency supervisory authority over private conduct.76
Agency review qualifies as active supervision by exercising ultimate con-
trol over the challenged anticompetitive conduct. 77 This "ultimate con-
trol" criterion necessarily entails the power to review the anticompetitive
conduct of private parties and the power to overturn a decision that fails
to accord with state policy.78 However, state agencies that silently ap-
prove or merely fail to object to the self-interested decisions or recom-
mendations of private parties conceivably satisfy this "ultimate control"
criterion.7 9 For example, in Southern Motor Carriers, the Court immu-
nized a process of collective ratemaking by private parties that received
only limited supervision.80 Rates proposed by these private parties be-
came effective if the state agency took no action within a specified period
of time." Therefore, active supervision appears to be satisfied as long as
state agencies have the power of ultimate review, whether or not it is
exercised in every instance.
The Supreme Court has specifically left open the question whether ju-
dicial review of private conduct can ever constitute active supervision for
purposes of the state action doctrine.82 The following sections explain
how judicial review fulfills the same function as agency review, and thus
should logically satisfy the supervision prong of the Midcal test.
B. Judicial Review Compared With Agency Review
Administrative agencies perform their supervisory function in place of
the state's judicial branch of power.83 Authority to supervise is delegated
76. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1664 (1988); Southern Motor Carri-
ers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 62 (1985).
77. See Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1663; 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.7
(1987); see also Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 n.10 (1985).
78. See Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1664; Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46; Bolt v. Halifax Hosp.
Medical Center, 851 F.2d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir.), vacated, 861 F.2d 1233 (1988) (en
bane).
79. It appears that active supervision does not require a state agency to actually hold
a hearing, or take evidence, or even write a decision in every case. See Southern Motor
Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 50-51, 64-65 (1985) (finding
immunity even where a proposed rate became effective if a state agency took no action
within a specific period of time); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 213c, at 75
(1978) ("[A]n allegation that state officials customarily 'rubber stamp' the self-interested
decisions or recommendations of the private parties involved should not ordinarily oust
Parker immunity.").
80. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 62 (government conceded that the state
actively supervised the collective ratemaking associations through a state agency).
81. See id. at 50-51.
82. See Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1664-65 (1988).
83. See generally K.C. Davis, Administrative Law 1-14 (3d ed. 1972) (tracing the
development, implications and policy considerations of administrative law).
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to an agency, rather than left in state courts, for one fundamental rea-
son-necessity.8 4 Supervision by administrative agencies is necessary to
prevent an overwhelming burden on the courts. 85
In performing their respective functions, courts and agencies provide
essentially the same level of supervision.86 An examination of three fac-
tors-convenience, competence and judicial economy-illustrates that
there is no principled basis for distinguishing the quality of supervision
provided by agencies from that provided by courts.8 7
First, it is argued that since a dispute often grows directly out of the
administrative handling of a particular situation, the particular agency
concerned can most conveniently conduct the proceeding. 8  The Midcal
supervision requirement, however, focuses on the quality of the state's
decision-whether certain anticompetitive conduct accords with state
policy-rather than on the mechanics of the decision itself. While ad-
ministrative agencies may be more convenient, supervision through the
judiciary arguably ensures more accurate implementation of state policy.
Courts are especially well-suited to interpret and enforce state legislative
policy.
89
A second perceived difference between agency and judicial review is
that much of the substance of administrative adjudication may be outside
the area of judicial competence to administer.90 For example, a special-
ized agency is arguably better qualified to assess the technical qualifica-
tions that form the basis of a lawsuit in a situation like the medical peer
review process involved in recent antitrust cases.91 Technical review of a
plaintiff's factual basis for suit in this case would amount to de novo
review. 92 It would be as unlikely in an administrative agency93 as it is in
84. Administrative agencies "furnish protection to rights and obstacles to wrongdo-
ing which under our new social and industrial conditions cannot be practically accom-
plished by the old and simple procedure of legislatures and courts." Id. at 7 (quoting
Elihu Root) (emphasis added).
85. See id.
86. See infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
87. See Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 851 F.2d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir.), va-
cated, 861 F.2d 1233 (1988) (en bane).
88. See K.C. Davis, supra note 83, at 13-14.
89. See Bolt, 851 F.2d at 1282.
90. See K.C. Davis, supra note 83, at 14.
91. See, ag., Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1663-64 (1988); Bolt, 851 F.2d at
1276-77.
92. A de novo standard of review looks at the merits of a case as if it had not been
heard before and no decision had been previously rendered. See 1 S. Childress & M.
Davis, Standards of Review: Federal Civil Cases and Review Process § 2.14, at 76 (1986)
("de novo" review is defined as the "appellate power, ability, and competency to come to
a different conclusion on the record as determined below"). In this Note, "de novo"
review is used interchangeably with "review on the merits." See infra notes 121-25 and
accompanying text.
93. In the privilege termination context, it is unclear whether an administrative
agency would review the merits of such a decision. See Amici Curiae Brief for American
Medical Association at 15, Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988) (No. 86-1145) (to
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the courts.94 A requirement of de novo review of private conduct would
force courts to act outside the area of judicial competence. It would im-
pose too great a burden on the states,9 5 and it would transform the evi-
dentiary Midcal second prong into a vehicle for invalidating a state-
chosen system of regulation.
A third perceived difference is that judicial review is awkward, slow
and expensive.96 The common assumption is that agency review, unlike
traditional judicial review, is automatic-that agencies are statutorily ob-
ligated to review every decision, regardless whether the aggrieved party
has lodged a complaint. 97 From this perspective agency review appears
more direct than the cumbersome and expensive process a wronged indi-
vidual must pursue in the state court system.98
Judicial review, however, may be equally automatic: a state statute
may expressly provide for judicial review.99 In addition, where state law
creates a cause of action for a specific wrong, judicial review is construc-
tively automatic; for an aggrieved party who pursues his remedy, it is as
effective as automatic review.
Judicial review also entails efficiency justifications. If the state pro-
require as a condition of immunity that each peer review decision be reviewed on the
merits by an agent of the state would make state compliance impossible).
94. See, e.g., Mendez v. Belton, 739 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1984) (affirming grant of
summary judgment since plaintiff "failed to establish the existence of a genuine factual
controversy"); Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173,
177 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[So long as staff selections are administered with fairness, geared
by a rationale compatible with hospital responsibility, and unencumbered with irrelevant
considerations, a court should not interfere."); Williams v. Kleaveland, 1983-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 65,486, at 68,357, 68,368 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (purpose of this litigation is
not to provide a de novo medical review, but rather to ensure that the process was bona
fide, and that the decisions were premised on valid medical concerns); Peterson v. Tucson
Gen. Hosp., 114 Ariz. 66, 72, 559 P.2d 186, 192 (1976) (applying Sosa standard); Garrow
v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549, 565, 401 A.2d 533, 541 (1979) (stan-
dard of review is merely to ascertain if there was sufficient reliable evidence in the record
to justify the result); Zoneraich v. Overlook Hosp., 212 N.J. Super. 83, 91-92, 514 A.2d
53, 57-58 (App. Div. 1986) (same).
95. See Amici Curiae Brief for American Medical Association at 15-16, Patrick v.
Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988) (No. 86-1145) (literally millions of peer review decisions
are made each year; even if the states wished to review all the decisions, they could not);
supra note 93.
96. See K.C. Davis, supra note 83, at 14.
97. See, e.g., Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 851 F.2d 1273, 1282 (1lth Cir.),
vacated, 861 F.2d 1233 (1988) (en banc).
98. See Casenote, supra note 21, at 948.
99. In Patrick, the Court suggests, without elaborating, that such statutes exist. See
Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. at 1658, 1665 (1988) (unclear whether Oregon law affords
any direct judicial review of private peer-review decisions since Oregon has no statute
expressly providing for judicial review of privilege terminations). In Bolt, the Court
made an even more oblique reference to the existence of such statutes. See Bolt, 851 F.2d
at 1282 (judicial review provided without express legislative authorization does not make
that review any less a form of regulation by the state).
For analogous statutes that to some extent provide for judicial review, see W. Keeton,
Prosser and Keeton on Torts 229-34 (5th ed. 1984) (violation of certain state or federal
statutes may subject defendant to liability on a negligence per se tort basis).
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vides a cause of action, plaintiffs may bring their claim to the attention of
the court. This obviates the need for an infrastructure of agencies that
must review each and every anticompetitive action of a private party. 100
C. Judicial Review as Active Supervision
1. The Requirement of "Active" Supervision
The Midcal test requires "active" supervision.' In light of recent
cases,1"2 the "active" requirement appears to be simply another reference
to the "ultimate power" criterion.10 3 The Supreme Court has not yet
decided whether judicial review is sufficiently "active" to satisfy the Mid-
cal supervision requirement."°
Commentary suggests that judicial review is merely passive state su-
pervision, if it qualifies as supervision at all.'0 5 Accepting judicial review
as "active" supervision arguably provides a meaningless standard be-
cause, in a broad sense, all persons are subject to judicial supervision.10 6
This argument, however, fails to consider that judicial review is only
available where state law has been violated. Only in such a situation does
an aggrieved individual have an enforceable claim through which to seek
a remedy. Yet, in this situation judicial supervision is as "active" as is
necessary. 10 7
While the Supreme Court has not elaborated on the "active" nature of
state supervision, 108 lower courts have shown a tendency to settle for
100. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
101. See, eg., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48, 62 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985); Califor-
nia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (the
State must actively supervise any private anticompetitive conduct).
102. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988); Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); see also infra note 108.
103. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
104. See Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
105. See Casenote, supra note 21, at 948 (criticizing the decision in Patrick v. Burget,
800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), reversed, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988)).
106. See id. at 948-50. Nevertheless, allowing judicial review to serve as active supervi-
sion does reinforce two public policies: the state policy of self-regulation and the avoid-
ance of frivolous claims. See id.
107. For example, the trial court in Patrick v. Burget awarded plaintiff substantial
damages on a state common law claim. Plaintiff had an enforceable claim only because
the defendant's conduct did not accord with state policy. See Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d
1498, 1505 (9th Cir. 1986), reversed, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988); see also cases cited infra note
124.
108. In Patrick, for example, the "active" element of the supervision requirement is
not specifically addressed. See Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1664. In this case respondents at-
tempted to show that the State of Oregon supervised the peer review process through two
state agencies and through the state judicial system. The Court determined that the two
state agencies had no authority or power to disapprove private privilege decisions. See id.
at 1664 (emphasis added). Discussing judicial review, the Court merely noted that the
case did not require it to decide whether state courts, acting in their judicial capacity,
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"effective" 1°9 or "adequate" 110 supervision, or "some lower level of su-
pervision," '111 when the defendant is a private party delegate of state au-
thority. "Effective" is perhaps a more appropriate adjective for the
Midcal supervision concept.112 "Effective" supervision would be more
consistent with the Court's essential requirement that a state official have
and exercise ultimate authority over private anticompetitive conduct.11
In addition, it would entail the same efficiency justifications noted in the
previous section. 14
Thus, while state court judicial review would likely satisfy an "effec-
could "adequately supervise private conduct for purposes of the state action doctrine."
Id. (emphasis added).
The Court explained that the supervision element mandates that the state exercise ulti-
mate control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct. See id. at 1663; supra notes
77-79 and accompanying text. In other words, the active supervision prong merely re-
quires that state officials "have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive
acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy." Id. at
1663; see infra note 113 and accompanying text.
Likewise, in Midcal the lack of any "active" element of the supervision requirement
was not addressed. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980). In this case the Court found no antitrust immunity for
California's wine-pricing system. Even though the Court found a clear legislative policy
to permit resale price maintenance, there was no state supervision of the anticompetitive
activity. See id. at 105.
The Court noted that the state simply authorized price setting and enforced the prices
established by private parties. See id. It neither established prices nor reviewed the rea-
sonableness of the price schedules, nor did it monitor market conditions or engage in any
pointed reexamination of the program. See id. at 105-06. The Court cited an earlier
California case that struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of liquor because the
state had played only a "passive" role in liquor pricing. See id. at 100 (citing Rice v.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 445, 579 P.2d 476, 486, 146
Cal. Rptr. 585, 595 (1978)). However, in formulating its holding, the Midcal Court de-
clined to use the active/passive language found in Rice to draw a distinction. See id. at
105.
109. See Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 851 F.2d 1273, 1282 (1lth Cir.), va-
cated, 861 F.2d 1233 (1988) (en bane). In holding that judicial review satisfies the active
supervision requirement, the Bolt court did not explain how judicial review is sufficiently
"active." The court came closest to reaching such a conclusion when it stated that the
fact "that judicial review is not automatic in the sense that it must be triggered by the
affirmative act of an aggrieved party does not make the state's supervision any less effec-
tive." Id. (emphasis added).
110. See Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1506 (9th Cir. 1986), reversed, 108 S. Ct.
1658 (1988).
111. See Fuchs v. Rural Elec. Convenience Coop., 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) S 68,247,
at 59,542 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that since defendant-an unregulated, not-for-profit
electric cooperative-was not a "purely private actor," it could be found immune without
the "active scrutiny" necessary for purely private entities).
112. For the analysis used in recent Supreme Court state action immunity cases, see
supra note 108.
113. See Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1664 (1988). The requirement that state
officials have and exercise ultimate authority does not mean that such officials must exer-
cise that authority in every instance. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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tive" supervision requirement, x15 it would also appear to satisfy an "ac-
tive" requirement that simply reiterates the ultimate power criterion for
Midcal supervision.
2. The "State Action" Requirement
The second Midcal prong requires active supervision by "the State it-
self.""' 6 Establishing a system of regulatory oversight demonstrates a
state's commitment to a program of regulation117 and, as the courts have
noted, there is no inherent reason why it must be a state agency rather
than a state court that provides such oversight.11 The action of state
courts is clearly regarded as state action in other contexts, such as four-
teenth amendment equal protection 19 and procedural due process analy-
ses.12 Thus, action of the state courts should suffice as state action for
purposes of the Midcal requirement.
3. The Standard of Review
Given this background of the Midcal test, a further problem can be
resolved: What standard of review should be required to satisfy the sec-
ond Midcal requirement? Dictum in Patrick v. Burget suggests that a
state court would need to review a privilege termination decision "on the
merits" before such judicial review could satisfy the Parker doctrine's
requirement of active supervision. 121
A more lenient standard of review would perhaps be as effective as
review on the merits. Review of the fairness of the procedures 122 used in
a privilege termination case may similarly entail the power to disapprove
those anticompetitive acts of private parties that fail to accord with state
policy.123 State courts normally review privilege termination decisions
115. See Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 851 F.2d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir.), va-
cated, 861 F.2d 1233 (1988) (en bane).
116. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980) (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389
(1978)).
117. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48,
61 n.23 (1985) (citing 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law S 213a, at 73 (1978)).
118. See Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 851 F.2d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir.), va-
cated, 861 F.2d 1233 (1988) (en banc); cf. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1664-65
(1988).
119. See, eg., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
120. Cf. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (a state normally can be held responsi-
ble for a decision where it has exercised coercive power); Spencer v. Lee, No. 87-1203,
slip op. at 5 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file) (dictum)
("Who does the state's business is the state's actor.").
121. See Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1665 (1988).
122. See Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 851 F.2d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir.), va-
cated, 861 F.2d 1233 (1988) (en bane) (review of the fairness of the procedures used,
including "consideration of whether the criteria used by decisionmakers were consistent
with state policy and whether the decision had a sufficient basis in fact") [hereinafter the
"procedural standard of review"].
123. See cases cited infra note 124. The Supreme Court seems to distinguish agency
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using a variant of the procedural review standard;124 review on the merits
would be unusual. A requirement of review on the merits would effec-
tively eliminate judicial review from the states' supervisory arsenal as far
as Parker immunity is concerned.125
4. Proposing a Change in the Burden of Proof
If judicial review satisfies the Midcal supervision requirement, an im-
portant issue before the courts will be whether actual review is necessary
or whether the availability of court review will suffice. The Supreme
Court has already characterized the supervision requirement as "eviden-
tiary;"' 126 it would not be inconsistent to resolve the issue using an evi-
dentiary test. The availability of judicial review could create a
presumption of active supervision by the state. The presumption would
review from judicial review and to impose two different standards: i) "Ultimate author-
ity" (apparently no more than the power to disapprove private privilege decisions on
procedural grounds) for agency review, see Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. at 1664, and ii)
Review on the merits for judicial review. See id. at 1665.
124. See, e.g., Applebaum v. Board of Directors of Barton Memorial Hosp., 104 Cal.
App. 3d 648, 656, 163 Cal. Rptr. 831, 836 (1980) (common law right to fair procedure
protects individuals from arbitrary exclusion or expulsion); North Broward Hosp. Dist.
v. Mizell, 148 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1962) (review of the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon
by the decisionmakers); Hackett v. Metropolitan Gen. Hosp., 422 So. 2d 986, 988-89
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (if a doctor cannot obtain judicial relief for violation of a
statute, its provisions are rendered meaningless; plaintiff's complaint as a whole suffi-
ciently alleges the denial of staff privileges); Dance v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 420 So.
2d 315, 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (review of privilege termination decisions to ascer-
tain whether they were reached by way of fair procedures); Jain v. Northwest Commu-
nity Hosp., 67 Ill. App. 3d 420, 424-25, 385 N.E.2d 108, 112 (1978) (applied procedural
review standard, noting parallel common law rule that voluntary associations which af-
fect important economic interests must conduct expulsion proceedings according to their
bylaws); Guerrero v. Burlington County Memorial Hosp., 70 N.J. 344, 360 A.2d 334
(1976):
[Balancing the'needs of the aggrieved party and the hospital, there are times
when] the wisdom of [a peer review] determination may be challenged. On such
occasions a reviewing court should confine its effort to determining whether the
decision made by the hospital is supported by substantial credible evidence and
is neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Id. at 355-56, 360 A.2d at 340; Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 404, 192
A.D.2d 817, 825 (1963) ("While reasonable... exercises ofjudgment should be honored,
courts would indeed be remiss if they declined to intervene [on privilege termination
decisions] for a reason unrelated to sound hospital standards and not in furtherance of
the common good."); Wright v. Bateson, 5 Or. App. 628, 631, 485 P.2d 641, 644 (1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972) ("Judicial review of administrative action is limited to
whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the findings: The court does not
try the case de novo."); see also cases cited supra note 94.
125. A requirement of review on the merits would give states an all-or-nothing choice,
either to install a full regulatory apparatus, or to withdraw in favor of competition. The
first option is likely to result in costly regulation. See Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 33;
see also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
A state should be able to choose to regulate private economic activity through its
courts or through a state agency. See Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 851 F.2d
1273, 1282 (1lth Cir.), vacated, 861 F.2d 1233 (1988) (en bane).
126. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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be rebutted by evidence that a state actually does not review the anticom-
petitive decisions of private parties. This evidentiary system would sat-
isfy the major concern underlying the Midcal supervision requirement-
that state officials have and exercise ultimate power to review and disap-
prove those anticompetitive acts that violate state policy. 127
CONCLUSION
Judicial review should satisfy the Midcal active supervision require-
ment to immunize a private party from antitrust liability. This conclu-
sion accords with the policy of deference to state economic choices in the
absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary. It also permits the
states a broader range of regulatory alternatives that is likely to result in
increased efficiency.
Applying a stricter Midcal test, and thereby preventing judicial review
from possibly satisfying the active supervision requirement, risks trans-
forming the procedural state action immunity test into a substantive eval-
uation of state economic wisdom. The better approach would allow state
court review as active supervision to immunize private parties from anti-
trust liability.
Michal Dlouhy
127. See Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. at 1658, 1664 (1988).
In addition, this approach would reconcile the split of opinion between Patrick and the
vacated Bolt decision. In the former case, evidence of no actual state court review of a
hospital's peer review decisions would have rebutted the presumption of active supervi-
sion. See Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1665. In the latter case, the presumption would stand; the
only evidence of actual review showed that state courts did indeed review peer review
decisions, albeit using the procedural review standard. See Bolt, 851 F.2d at 1282.
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